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BOOK REVIEWS
PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE AS EDUCATOR, by Thomas Dubay, S.M.
Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1959. Pp. 223. $5.95.
Reviewed by
GEORGE A. TIMONE*
Problems involving basic educational
policy at all levels of government seem on
the increase both in frequency and im-
portance. On the international scene, we
read of an eloquent plea by a United States
delegate before a commission of the United
Nations for explicit recognition of the right
of religious bodies to maintain schools.
Bills involving federal aid to education
again provide stormy debate. New York
State is in the process of deciding whether
the needs for post secondary education
are to be met primarily by more and larger
units in the State University or whether it
is preferable to assist financially existing
private colleges or, through additional
scholarships, the students who wish to at-
tend them. Locally, school districts are still
groping for a formula to tell them the ex-
tent and limits to which they should teach
moral and spiritual values in the public
school and release children during school
hours for religious instruction outside
school buildings.
It would be an exaggeration to suggest
that Philosophy of the State as Educator
by Thomas Dubay, S.M. gives simple an-
swers to these and other particular prob-
lems. It is fair to say that in this legal but
*Justice of the Domestic Relations Court of the
City of New York.
primarily philosophical study of the state's
role as an educator, Father Dubay looks
into the philosophical roots of the problem,
draws out their consequences, then illus-
trates the principles and conclusions by in-
dicating pertinent practices of the nations
of the world. The book is documented
with meticulous care by 175 citations and
quotations. It contains a summary and an
extensive bibliography. Its permanent ref-
erence value is also enhanced by an unus-
ually good index.
The author develops his theme system-
atically by commencing in Part I with the
philosophy of the nature and function of
the state, from which he proceeds in Part
II to a consideration of the state as an
educator. Parts III and IV consider many
particular problems involved in the state's
role such as distributive justice, the con-
trol, regulation and inspection of non-
public schools, academic freedom,
compulsory education and international
cooperation.
The author's major premise is a thor-
ough and skillful exposition of the natural
law principle of subsidiarity. For the col-
lectivist the state is paternal; it is the
provider. At the other extreme lies the
individualist or laissez-faire state which
sees itself as a mere umpire regulating as
little as possible the free competitive forces
of society. Between these two extremes, lies
the principle of subsidiarity. This principle
"... applies not only to the sovereign state
but to all lesser government agencies and
societies as well. A national government
should not do what a regional government
finds possible, nor should the latter under-
take what falls within the competency of
a local government."'
The author demonstrates by authority
(Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno and
Pope Pius XII in Summi Pontificatus) and
by reason the validity of this principle.2
This, of course, is not exclusively Catholic
doctrine. President Eisenhower has re-
marked that "The Federal Government
should perform an essential task only when
it cannot otherwise be adequately per-
formed. . .. -3 This natural law principle
bears more frequent restatement in this
age when so many seem to believe that
the facile solution to most problems, so-
cial and educational, is. simply to turn
them over to the Federal Government.
Subsidiarity allows fuller development of
the human person by allowing him activity
and freedom in those areas in which he is
capable, provided no harm be done to
the individual or to the common good. It
is bottomed on the premise that "when
a man unnecessarily depends on others his
own growth and personal dignity suffer."4
A state, too, loses in efficiency when it
undertakes more problems than it can
handle with effectiveness. It is true the
world over that large scale government
tends to a greater sluggishness as it grows.
The author cautions us, however, that the
criterion of subsidiarity is not always easy
I DUBAY, PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE AS EDUCATOR
22 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DUBAY].
2 Id. at 23.
3 Time, Jan. 17, 1955, p. 22, col. 2.
'DUBAY 23.
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to apply to concrete situations and that
"The'cry of 'creeping socialism' should not





The author then moves into a consider-
ation of the principle of subsidiarity as
applied to education. He criticizes the ex-
treme individualist political philosophy of
Herbert Spencer who argued that the state
should be no more than a mere protector
and that its entrance into welfare and edu-
cation is an unwarranted intrusion. He is
also critical of the milder form of individu-
alism espoused by John Stuart Mill as
unduly restrictive of governmental activity
in a modern society. He is, however, in
accord with Mill in vigorously opposing
governmental monopoly over education at
any level as despotic, "for once a govern-
ment could mold opinions and ideas, it
could do with the citizenry whatever it
wished. '" 6
Having disproved quite successfully the
individualist philosophy of the state's func-
tion in education, which incidentally is now
for the most part a matter of historical
interest, Father Dubay proceeds to dissect
statism in education which he subdivides
into three categories, extreme, conservative
and ordinary secularistic. The ancient clas-
sical exponent of the first group is Plato,
who in his Book V of the Republic ex-
pounds the view that after birth the govern-
ment should assume full control of the
child from his parents. The modern domi-
nant exponent of extreme statism is, of
course, Communism. Conservative statism
is an "educational philosophy of the state
that assigns to government an excessive
educational function and yet does not rule
5 Id. at 24.
6 Id. at 39.
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out of life the need for religion."'7 This is
illustrated as far back as 1799 in*Samuel
Knox's Essay on Education as well as by
certain recent pronouncements of the Na-
tional Education Association.
Although the dividing line between con-
servative and secularistic statism is not al-
ways clear, the author regards Rousseau
and Alexander Meiklejohn as principal
authorities of the latter school. Since au-
thority is manifestly necessary for the oper-
ation of society and the school, and since
Meiklejohn contends that God is not the
source of that authority, he finds it in the
"pattern of culture," which means in effect
that education is the agent of a social,
cultural intention. We have here, says the
author, "nothing but the custom theory in
a new dress." s Secularistic statism in edu-
cation argues for a common system of edu-
cation to reduce religious bias and believes
non-public schools to be essentially divisive
and undemocratic.
The state has a "vital and noble" but
still an essentially supplementary and sub-
sidiary function in education.9 The Church
and the family are the primary educators;
the Church because of her direct commis-
sion given to her by Christ,10 and the fam-
ily because it flows from the very natures
of all concerned because "before being a
citizen man must exist; and existence does
not come from the state, but from the
parents.""
The state's educational function is both
protective and promotive. It must protect
7 Id. at 47.
8 Id. at 50.
9 Id. at 222.
10 Matthew 28:19-20 "Go, therefore, and make
disciples of all nations . . . teaching them to ob-
serve all that I have commanded you. Ibid.
11 DUAY 58.
the rights of the Church and the family,
and beyond this, it has the duty to pro-
mote by positive means the citizen's edu-
cational welfare. This includes (a) assist-
ing the initiative of the Church and family,
(b) the establishment of public schools
wherever and whenever such are needed,
(c) exacting a minimum of education in its
citizens, and (d) sponsoring programs of
civic education aimed at the populace at
large.
In applying basic philosophical principles
to modern states, the author, by quoting
their pertinent statutes, demonstrates that
Communist countries, as may be expected,
deny both parent and Church rights in edu-
cation. This is also true of some so-called
democracies. Mexico, for example, has a
constitutional provision prohibiting relig-
ious corporations, ministers of religion and
associations devoted to the propagation of
any religious creed, from participating in
any way "in institutions giving primary,
secondary and normal education and edu-
cation for laborers and field workers."' 2
Norway and Switzerland unduly limit the
Church's rights. 13 The author finds that the
nations with the most satisfactory constitu-
tional provisions explicitly recognizing both
Church and family rights are Canada,
Spain, Liechtenstein, and especially Ire-
land. 1
4
The author firmly sets the subsidiary
function of the state as an educator against
the notion that it is the primary educator of
children. He points out that "it is no more
such an educator than it is the primary
farmer or physician. If private endeavor
fails to farm or to heal efficiently, the state
12 Id. at 83.
Is Id. at 84, 85.
14 Id. at 89.
may step in and supply what is lacking, but
it may go no further. So also, if private ini-
tiative is unequal to the educational task,
the state may and must apply what is lack-
ing, but nothing more." 15
From the basic principles he has ex-
pounded, Father Dubay maintains that as
a matter of distributive justice ". . . the
state is bound to dispense educational tax
money according to the reasonable needs
of the primary educators." This does not
mean building or maintaining schools for
any group that may demand it, no matter
how small or ill-equipped that group may-
be. It does mean that where the group is
large enough to sponsor an efficient school,
they as primary educators have a right in
justice to expect assistance from tax
moneys.' 6 The author points out that "The
policy adopted in some modem nations of
excluding denominational schools from
State Aid merely enthrones the secularistic
religion of a minority as the official attitude
of the public system." 7
In support of the feasibility as well as
the justice of public support for private ed-
ucation, the author cites the English system
and Gladstone's argument that there is, in
effect, a suppression of freedom in the
denial of governmental subsidy to one or
another school system.' 8 "Consequently,
[said Gladstone] you may well believe I
contemplate with satisfaction the state of
feeling that prevails in England, and that
has led all governments [sic] to adopt the
system of separate and independent subsi-
dies to the various religious denomina-
tions."' 9 The constitution or statutes of
15 Id. at 222.
16 Id. at 106.
1T Id. at 110.
18 Id. at 109.
19 Ibid.
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other modem nations, notably Canada,
West Germany, Scotland and Netherlands
permit the use of tax moneys for private as
well as for public schools.2 0
The "establishment of religion" clause of
the First Amendment of our Federal Con-
stitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Everson v. Board of Educ.,21
and explicit provisions in thirty-eight state
constitutions, all forbid the use of public
funds to assist denominational schools. Al-
though the possibility of a change in this
policy seems quite remote, the author pre-
sents an effective case in basic principle as
well as in the current practices of other
democracies. This does not mean however
that American Catholics now expect or
want public funds for the general educa-
tional purposes of their schools. A large
body of Catholic opinion would favor re-
jecting such funds if available because of
the degree of control and loss of academic
freedom they fear would inevitably follow
such grants.
The practice of granting auxiliary serv-
ices is treated briefly and approved as obvi-
ous distributive justice.2 2 Such services
include transportation to and from school,
medical examinations and school lunches.
Catholic parents have an unanswerable
argument in urging that their children are
entitled to auxiliary services on a basis of
equality with public school children because
these are health and welfare, not educa-
tional services; and further, they aid the
child rather than the school. The Everson
case so held. Still, at present only 19 states
provide bus transportation for non-public
school children; and at present the consti-
20 Id. at 122.
21 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22 DUBAY 124-26.
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tutions of twenty-seven states forbid the use
of public moneys for lunches to non-public
school children, thereby requiring the De-
partment of Agriculture to administer the
Federal School Lunch Program directly to
such schools.
On whether, and to what extent, the state
may exercise control over private education,
Father Dubay demonstrates the division of
opinion in the 19th Century among non-
Catholic as well as Catholic political scien-
tists and philosophers. By far the prevailing
opinion, expressed again and again by
Catholic writers, admits "both the right and
the duty of the state to supervise education,
to examine teachers and to inspect
schools. '23
Panama, India and Syria are cited as
among the few countries which expressly
require private schools to admit all groups,
irrespective of social, racial or political dif-
fetences, 24 and it is stated that "The United
States makes no regulation binding private
education to admit or reject any particular
group."' 25 This statement while technically
accurate seems to your reviewer to be rather
incomplete in that there is no reference to
state regulations. For example, the New
York Fair Educational Practice statute
makes it illegal for any non-public post-
secondary educational institution to dis-
criminate in admissions because of "race,
religion, creed, color or national origin" but
broadly exempts a "religious or denomina7
tional educational institution" and provides
that nothing in the statute shall prevent
such an institution "to select its students
exclusively or primarily from members of
28 Id. at 130.
24 Id. at 138.
25 Ibid.
such religion or denomination or from
giving preference in such selection . . . of
its students as is calculated by such institu-
tion to promote the religious principles for
which it is established or maintained.
'2
There is a well documented analysis of
international practices dealing with the
teaching of religion in public schools from
which these noteworthy conclusions
emerge: 27
1. The teaching of religion (not merely
about religion) in publicly supported
schools is a common practice among the
nations of the world (e.g. Scotland, Eng-
land, Syria, Australia, Canada, Belgium,
Brazil, Panama, West Germany, India,
Sweden and Spain).
2. Such teaching is a common practice
even in religiously pluralistic societies.
3. Among the free, democratic nations,
the United States of America seems to be
one of the few exceptions to the rule.
4. The various systems adopted for the
teaching of religion in public institutions
seems, on the whole, to work out tvell. The
great majority of parents enthusiastically
avail themselves of the program when it is
available.
5. Finally, "The fears and obstacles to
religious instruction in the public schools of
the United States so often alleged by Amer-
ican secularists are shown to be vain and
for the most part baseless. One may not
raise up phantoms to counteract fact. '28
Most of us will readily agree with the
author that "The religious formation given
in the home or in Sunday school is no
longer adequate in the world in which we
live. ' 29 He also argues that it is, in a sense,
2 6 N. Y. EDUC. LAW § 313 (3)(a).
27 DUBAY 160.
28 Id. at 16 1.
29 Id. at 147.
impossible for a public school to be really
neutral in the matter of religion because
"By omitting matters of religion the school
is teaching by silence that it considers secu-
lar affairs of greater importance than re-
ligious ones."30
Public school authorities and religious
groups, recognizing the tragic incomplete-
ness of education without religion, have
made attempts within the limitations im-
posed by state constitutions and Supreme
Court decisions,3 1 to ameliorate this sad
state of affairs which throws the weight of
publicly supported education too heavily on
the side of the atheist and agnostic. These
efforts have taken the form of various plans
for the teaching of "moral and spiritual val-
ues" in the school building coupled with a
program of "released time" for the teaching
of religion outside the school building.
Although the Church alone has been di-
vinely authorized and commissioned to
teach morality as well as religion,32 this
does not mean that the Catholic Church
envision herself as having a complete
monopoly on moral truth. The state has a
role in teaching morality stemming from its
duty to preserve the community from harm
and to protect and supplement the primary
educators (i.e. the Church and family).
Furthermore, much morality is based on
mere natural law, and on the natural plane
the state is competent. Therefore, "In its
own public schools the state not only may
but must provide for instruction in moral-
ity."'33 It is obvious however that instruction
in right and wrong "cannot be separated
30 Ibid.
31 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Mc-
Collum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32 Matthew 28:19-20.
33 DUBAY 177.
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from religion if any appreciable result is to
be expected. '3 4 To attempt to teach right
and wrong without reference to religion is
at best a truncated morality. A discussion of
the "released time" programs is probably
considered outside the scope of the author's
scholarly work and is therefore not in-
cluded.
The author briefly refers to the current
practice in many public school classrooms
or assemblies of Bible reading and finds this
to be "decidedly sectarian. '35 This is one
of the rare occasions on which the reviewer
feels constrained to disagree with the au-
thor. Bible reading has been sustained in
the courts36 on the basis that it is not
sectarian. It is true that some passages are
sectarian in content or implication and that
explanations, if permitted, would involve
sectarian doctrine. It does not follow that
the reading of selected passages without
note or comment is a sectarian practice and
constitutes the teaching of denominational
tenets. We start, of course, with the premise
that "We are a religious people whose in-
stitutions presuppose a Supreme Being. '37
These practices, the efforts at teaching
of moral and spiritual values, the selected
bible reading without comment, the recital
in school of a simple invocation to Divine
Providence 38 and the "released time" pro-
34 Ibid.
35 Id. at 148.
36 See, e.g., Lewis v. Board of Educ., 157 Misc.
520, 285 N.Y. Supp. 164 (1935), modified, 247
App. Div. 106,286 N.Y. Supp. 174 (1936), appeal
dismissed, 276 N.Y. 490, 12 N.E.2d 172 (1937);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d
880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952)
(jurisdictional grounds).
37 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
38 The invocation recommended by the New York
State Board of Regents is "Almighty God, we
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gram of religious instruction are not an
answer to the criticism of a secularistic
education. They are however efforts to
minimize its disadvantages and therefore, in
the reviewer's opinion, merit our support.
On the question of centralization of ed-
ucational effort and authority, there is an
analysis of the arguments for and against
centralization 39 and a review of the systems
that obtain in various countries. 40 The
principle of subsidiarity is applicable here.
In educational policy, "subsidiarity means
that a centralized arm of government ought
not to undertake the work of education if
that work can be done effectively by a local
unit." 41
In this carefully documented volume, the
author expounds basic philosophical prin-
ciples and methodically applies them to
practices here and abroad in the tremen-
dously important field of education. He has
done it well. This book is a worthwhile
addition to the library not only of a Catho-
lic lawyer but of anyone seriously interested
in educational policy.
THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, by Thomas E. Davitt, S.J.
Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1959. Pp. 370. $9.00
Reviewed by
JOHN C. H. Wu*
This book is an introductory book on
jurisprudence, which the author identifies
with the philosophy of law. The book is
divided into four parts. The first part deals
with "man-made law," the second with
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teach-
ers and our Country." Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc.2d
659, 660, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 459 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The Engel case is a learned and exhaustive opin-
ion by Meyer, J., which holds that the noncom-
pulsory recital of this prayer by public school
children pursuant to a Board of Education resolu-
tion, is not violative of the Federal or State Con-
stitution. At this writing an appeal is pending in
the Appellate Division. See discussion of this case
in 6 CATHOLIC LAWYER 164 (Spring 1960).
39 DUBAY 162-64.
40 Id. at 165-68.
*Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School
of Law.
"man-discovered law," the third with "in-
tegration of man-made law," and the fourth
with "background of law." The first part
has six chapters, treating of the nature, end,
content, source, sanction and obligation of
man-made law. The second part has five
chapters, treating first of references, in
judicial decisions and legislative enact-
ments, to a law not man-made, then of
the nature of man-discovered law, its con-
tent, source and end, its sanction and obli-
gation, and finally its relation to man-made
law. The third part has eight chapters,
treating first of principles and patterns of
41 Id. at 163. President Eisenhower's statement to
the 1955 White House Conference on Education
said that education "should be under the control
of the family apd the locality. It should not be
controlled by a central authority." Ibid.
